structural model uses market equity timely information for default prediction.
Introduction
and Black and Scholes (1973) presented the basic approach for the valuation of stocks and corporate bonds as derivatives on the firm's assets. Merton (1974) is a structural model used for default prediction, viewing the firm's equity as a call option on its assets, because equity holders are entitled to the residual value of the firm after all its obligations are paid. Many theoretical studies suggested models that relax some of the Merton model restrictive assumptions. 1 However, empirical literature mainly focused on the application of the original model. 2 A major benchmark in these studies is the KMV model. KMV was founded in 1989 offering a commercial extension of Merton's model using market-based data. In 2002 it was acquired by Moody's and became Moody's-KMV.
KMV published a number of papers which reveal some of its methods (see Keenan and Sobehart, 1999; Keenan, Sobehart and Stein, 2000; Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) . Some of the specifications made by KMV were adopted by the academic literature. Vassalou and Xing (2004) , Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2007) are examples for such studies.
Only a few studies attempted to evaluate the accuracy of Merton's model under these specifications. Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004) compared the predictive power of the Merton model to Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models (Z-score and O-score) and came to the conclusion that the Merton model outperforms these models. Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) showed that macroeconomic variables such as interest rate, historical stock return and historical market return have default prediction ability even after controlling for Merton model's distance to default. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2007) , using a hazard model, combined Merton model default probability with other variables relevant to default prediction. They also found that Merton model probabilities have relatively little contribution to the predictive power. Bharath and Shumway (2008) presented a "naïve" application of Merton model that outperformed the complex application of Merton model (based on presumably Moody's-KMV specifications). 3 Another line of literature examined structural models ability to explain credit spreads and concluded that Merton model predictions underestimate market spreads. 4 In this paper we examine the sensitivity of Merton model's default predictability to its parameter specifications. We assess the causes for this sensitivity and for prior studies lukewarm performance and conclude by providing a few prescriptions to enhance the model accuracy. We focus on the three main components of the model: the default barrier, the expected return on firm assets and the firm assets return volatility (hereafter, asset volatility) . For this purpose we construct a sample with annual observations of firms from the merged CRSP/Compustat database during the period 1988-2008. We also gather information on default events during 1989-2009 from Standard and Poor's (S&P) and
Moody's rating agencies reports. After filtering our sample includes 41,831 annual observations of 5,845 firms, of which 322 observations defaulted in the following year.
For each specification of the model we construct a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. This method is relatively common for the comparison of prediction models since it does not require setting a priori the desired cutoff point between cost of type I error and cost of type II error. Another advantage of using ROC curves, compared to methods used in some prior studies, is that it enables statistical inference with the non-parametric test suggested by DeLong, DeLong and Clarke-Pearson (2008) , testing the statistical significance of the differences between the ROC curves (of two models).
Prior studies, such as Bharath and Shumway (2008) , focused mainly on the rate of defaulters within the first deciles of firms (highest predicted default probabilities) and did not offer a robust statistical test for differences between models.
Another approach we use to understand the adequacy of various specifications is the study of firms' characteristics changes on a path to default. For this purpose we focus on 137 defaulting firms with data available for the five years preceding the default event and compare their level of debt, stock returns, equity volatility and assets volatility to those of a group of 137 non-defaulting firms.
We find that Merton model accuracy is only slightly sensitive to the specification of the default barrier. We explain that this is a result of the calculated assets value and volatility dependence on the default barrier. On one hand, ceteris paribus, a low setting of default barrier for risky firms reduces their probability of default. On the other hand, such misspecification also causes overestimation of assets volatility and underestimation of assets value, thus increasing the default probability.
Therefore, a deviation of the default barrier from the common practices has a relatively small effect on the model accuracy.
We also show that using historical equity return as a proxy for expected assets return is questionable. 5 In particular, realized returns for risky firms are low and sometimes negative. While negative stock returns may be a predictive indicator for default, it cannot be a good proxy for forward-looking expected returns. Such a specification simply reduces the precision of the model. There are several ways to minimize the effect of negative returns. Aiming to estimate forward looking expected returns, we present a CAPM based procedure and results. However, we show that setting expected assets return equal to the highest of realized stock return and the risk-free interest rate seems preferable among the alternatives examined in this study.
Our calculations demonstrate that assets volatility extracted from Black and Scholes (1973) using the historical volatility of equity is under-biased, especially for defaulting firms. This is mainly because the value of equity used for this purpose is up-to-date and forward looking while the backward looking historical volatility of equity is estimated on stock returns that might exhibit mild volatility prior to the deterioration in the financial state of the firm. We show that on average the difference between implied volatility (of stock options) and historical volatility is positive. This difference is larger for defaulting firms than for non-defaulting firms. Hence, model accuracy seems higher using equity volatility than using the theoretical asset volatility calculated by simultaneously solving Black and Scholes (1973) and the volatility relation of Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) .
Finally we analyze Bharath and Shumway (2008) naïve model. We show that the superiority of this model to the more computationally intensive Merton model is due to its special "estimation" of assets volatility. Hence, following our analysis of various alternatives, we suggest a specification of Merton model that outperforms this naïve model. The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the Merton model. Section 2 discusses the difficulties and common practices in the application of Merton model. In section 3 we present the methodology and particularly the way we compare model accuracy under various specifications. Section 4 describes the data. In section 5 we present and discuss the results. Section 6 concludes.
Merton model
Merton model uses the firm equity value, its debt face value, and the volatility of equity returns to evaluate the firm assets and debt. The model assumes that the firm has issued one zero-coupon bond.
The firm defaults at the bond maturity (in time T) when the value of its assets (A) falls below the amount of debt it has to repay (D). Otherwise the firm pays its debt in full and the remaining value is its equity E T = max(A T -D,0). The model assumes that A follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM):
(1)
where is the expected continuous-compounded return on A, is the volatility of assets returns and dW is the standard Wiener process. 6 6 We omit the subscript t from A and W for convenience. Obviously these vary with time. The drift and the volatility are assumed constant in this basic (classical) model.
The model applies the Black and Scholes (1973) formula to calculate the value of the firm equity as a call option on its assets with expiration time T and an exercise price equal to the amount of debt (D):
(2) √
⁄ .
√
where is the value of the firm equity, r is the risk free interest rate, and N(•) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 7 Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) show that under the model assumptions the relation between the equity volatility ( ) and the assets volatility ( ) is 
. √ DD may be regarded as the normalized distance between the firm assets value (A) and the face value of its debt (D). 8 As the log asset value is normally distributed under the GBM, PD -the probability of default (the probability that the call option is not exercised) is:
Application of the Merton model
The application of the model in practice requires several refinements. T is usually assumed to be 1
year. The annualized historical volatility of the equity is frequently the choice for . 9 It is often estimated over the preceding one year period and we denote it by , . Another issue is the amount of debt that is relevant to a potential default during a one year period. Total debt is inadequate when not all of it is due in one year, as the firm may remain solvent even when the value of its assets falls below its total liabilities. Using the short term debt (debt maturing in one year) for the default barrier D would be often wrong, for example, when there are covenants that force the firm to serve other debts when its financial situation deteriorates. Prior studies generally follow KMV (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) and chose short-term debt plus half of the long term debt for the default barrier. 10 In this work we use • for the default barrier, where is the short term debt, is the long term debt and is the multiplier. We test the predictability power of the model for various values of k and check whether the KMV choice of 0.5 outperforms the alternatives.
Since the values of a firm's assets (A) and their volatility ( ) are not observed, we solve equations (2) and (4) simultaneously. 11 This method was originally proposed by Merton (1974) and refined by Jones et al (1984) , it is also implemented in Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) . The expected asset return , has to be estimated separately. Campbell et al. (2008) , for example, used a constant market premium and calculated it as 9 A forward looking implied volatility is probably a better choice. However it is not available for many firms and in its extraction from market data is complicated by liquidity and volatility smiles. 10 For example: Bharath and Shumway (2008) , Vassalou and Xing (2004) , Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) , Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) . 11 Another approach, used by Bharath and Shumway (2008) , Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) ) is a complicated iterative procedure. In this process an initial guess value of is used in equation (2) in order to infer the market value of the assets ( ) for the firm on a daily basis in the prior year. This generates a time series which is used to derive an "updated" . This new is used to compute a new time series of the firm's assets. The procedure is repeated until the volatility used to calculate the time series converges to the volatility of the calculated values. Then, the last time series is used to infer the values of and which are used in equation (5) of the model. Bharath and Shumway (2008) showed that this approach results are in fact similar or even slightly inferior to the results of the simultaneous approach implemented in this paper. 0.06. In this work we examine several alternatives for . Under the first two alternatives we apply the CAPM model • , where is the market premium and is the assets beta.
First we use daily observations from the previous year on daily stock returns and the CRSP value weighted NYSE-NASDAQ-AMEX index to estimate the equity beta . Then we use the relation • and the values of , , to calculate . 12 We use two alternative values for MP.
The first is a constant rate of 6%, which results in is the annual rate of return of the S&P500 index in the previous year. For our third alternative we simply assume that the expected asset return equals the historical equity return of the preceding year, , . We use this alternative as a benchmark for the other two methods and in accordance to the naïve model of Bharath and Shumway (2008) . Historical equity return ( , ) is sometimes negative.
Hence we also examine the possibility that a floor for the assets expected return is and thus examine the results of max , , . Another alternative is to assume that the assets expected return equals the risk-free rate, . In this case the probability measure that governs the asset and default processes is the risk-neutral measure. We also examine the alternative of a constant asset return 0.09.
For comparison, we use the naïve alternative of Bharath and Shumway (2008) for Merton model. In this naïve model the default barrier D is 0.5 • . The value of assets is set to be the sum of the default barrier and equity values: . The expected return of assets is set equal to the historical return on the firm stock price in the previous year: , . Assets volatility 12 The relation between the assets and equity betas is derived from the expression of a Black-Scholes call beta • • where we replace the call option and the underlying by the equity and the assets respectively (see for example Coval and Shumway 2001) . We then use equation (4) to replace by the volatilities ratio .
is assumed to be a value-weighted average of historical equity volatility ( , ) and a "special" value of the debt volatility: 13 7 0.05 0.25 • , , and the default probability is: .
Methodology
Examination of a default model goodness may be of two types. Prior studies such as Bharath and Shumway (2008) measured the accuracy of default models using the defaulting firms' fraction in the lowest-quality deciles among all defaulting firms in the sample.
This method is in fact based on particular points on a power curve and does not encompass the information in the entire curve. A power curve shows the cumulative percentage of defaulting firms among all defaulting firms for each percentile of the predicting score. In other words, it shows the percentage of defaulting firms that are detected for each threshold value of the score ( in the above PD example). The Accuracy Ratio (AR) is twice the area between the 45⁰ line and the power curve and it is equivalent to ROC curve comparison, in fact 2 • 1. 15 Hence the deciles comparison method is also a limited snapshot of particular points on the ROC curve. A major advantage of using ROC curves is the availability of statistical inference methods and tests such as that of DeLong et al. (1988) .
In addition to ROC curve analysis we also examine changes of selected variables prior to default. Our 
Data
The initial sample for this study includes all firms in the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT database of 17 These reports cover firms that have been rated sometime and hence tend to be biased toward large firms. Therefore our default information regarding small firms is not reliable and we filter them out of the sample.
not end in December 31. 18 Similar to Bharath and Shumway (2008) and others we exclude financial firms (SIC Codes: 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035, and 6036). This filtering is needed since financial firms are characterized by high leverage and strict regulations. We also filter out defaulting firms for three years subsequent to a default event. 19 Our final sample contains 41,831 annual observations of 5,846
firms with 322 cases of defaults. Table 1 shows We use stock price data to compute the annual return , , and the annualized standard deviation of daily returns , for each year preceding an annual observation of a company. The beta of stock returns ( ) is estimated in a standard technique using the CRSP value-weighted return of NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX index as the market index. The market value of equity for each annual observation equals the stock prices times the number of outstanding shares. Using a MATLAB program we simultaneously solve equations (2) and (4) for each annual observation and compute the assets value and volatility ( and ) . Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. The average market value in our sample is 4,750 which is greater than 808.8 of Bharath and Shumway (2008) . We relate this difference to the exclusion of small firms from our sample. Nevertheless, the average annual stock returns of both samples are similar, 14.0 percent and 13.75 percent respectively. 20 The average in our filtered sample is 0.805. Among other possible reasons, we can relate an average smaller than 1 to the selection of our sample which excludes small firms.
Results
We begin by an evaluation of the effects of changes to the default barrier, the expected asset return and the assets returns volatility, using ROC curves and AUC methods (as discussed above). We then study the properties of Bharath and Shummway (2008) naïve model and examine what appears to make this naïve model more accurate than the complex application of the Merton model. 21 Then we suggest a specification that seems to outperform the complex model and the naïve model of Bharath and Shumway (2008).
The default barrier
We estimate the model using five long-term debt (LTD) multipliers (k) values. For that purpose we calculate and by solving equations (2) and (4) shows that although the greatest AUC is for k=0.5, the largest gap between two AUC values is merely 0.001. DeLong et al. (1988) test in Table 3 reveals that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the AUCs for k=0.1, k=0.3, k=0.7 equal the AUC of k=0.5.
20 It may seem odd that the minimum value of annual stock return is below -100%. Notice however that , stands for the continuously-compounded annual return. e.g. in a rare case, when a stock drops by 80% in a year, its continuous rate of return is ln(0.2) = -161% per annum. Bharath and Shumway (2008) winsorized their sample and hence their minimum value of annual stock return was -85.45%. However, their minimum value for annual asset return was also extremely low: -253.58%.
21 Lacking a better word, we use 'complex' to refer to applications of Merton model that do not utilize shortcuts such as that of the naïve model of Bharath and Shummway (2008) , our simplified solution, etc. The complex application of this paper is the simultaneous solution of equations (2) and (4) with its various specification alternatives. As presented earlier, Bharath and Shummway (2008) also compared their results to another, more complex application of the model, utilizing the iterative method presumably developed and used by KMV.
The AUC for the various k specifications is around 0.92 which is equivalent to an Accuracy Ratio of 0.84. Duffie et al. (2007) for example achieved an AR of 0.87 using a much more complex model.
One cannot compare models by comparing their AUC or AR based on different samples, however, this comparison may support the adequacy of our sample. Table 4 shows the evolution of / prior to default, where is obtained from the simultaneous solution of equations (2) and (4) with 0.5 for the default barrier. 22 Using t tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests we find statistically significant differences between / ratio of defaulting and non-defaulting firms. Furthermore, the gap between the two groups increases as firms come nearer to the default event. The average value for the defaulting firms, five years before default is 0.433 in comparison to 0.269 for the non-defaulting firms. As time passes, the / ratio of the non-defaulting firms slightly increases whereas the ratio for the defaulting firms rises dramatically. 23 A year before default the average ratio for the defaulting firms reaches 0.754 while the average ratio for the non-defaulting firms is 0.325 only.
It appears that the model power is only slightly sensitive to the multiplier while by itself exhibits predictive power. This somewhat puzzling behavior results in from the calculation method of and . The firm equity is regarded as a call option on the firm assets. Hence, an underspecification of the strike price (default barrier) results in an underestimation of the underlying assets value ( ) and overestimation of the assets volatility ( ) in a simultaneous solution of equations (2) and (4). Underestimation of or overestimation of results in a reduction in the distance to default and thus an increase in the probability of default, hence reducing the sensitivity of PD to changes in k.
The underestimation of the probability of default caused directly from under-specification of the default barrier is compensated indirectly by underestimation of and overestimation of . This seems to explain the model low sensitivity to the default barrier specification. 24 Table 5 shows the properties of and . As expected, for lower values of the default barrier (small k) we find lower mean and median and higher mean and median . We use t tests and Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests and find that the differences of values resulted from various specifications of k compared to the values calculated using k=0.5 are statistically significant . The skewness has no effect on the power analysis of Merton model because it has no effect on the ranking of firms according to their distance to default.
The five LTD multipliers (k) we use yield substantially different probabilities of default. For example, using the highest LTD multiplier (0.9) the mean PD is 30% larger than the mean PD using the lowest LTD multiplier (0.1). t tests and Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests reveal that the mean (median) probabilities of default for k=0.1, k=0.3 are lower than those of k=0.5, and for k=0.7, k=0.9 are higher than those of k=0.5. This suggests that the calibration of the model is substantially different for each specification. However, as discussed above, the model's power (the ability to distinguish a defaulting firm from a non-defaulting firm) is relatively insensitive to k.
The expected return on the firm's assets ( )
We examine several alternatives to assess the model sensitivity to assets expected returns. In all cases we use k=0.5 and solve simultaneously equations (2) and (4) and & . However, as expected, the mean of , , is very high (0.274). Table 7 shows that using , , results in the largest AUC. The AUC of is slightly larger than that of . and the latter is slightly larger than that of , . The (0.9207) is also statistically insignificant. ROC curves in Figure 3 show the predictive power of three alternatives:
Panel b in
. , & and , . The figure demonstrates that the model's power is apparently insensitive to the specification set we use.
It is interesting to point out that the AUC of . is close to the highest, demonstrating that in this case β seems to outperform the predictability offered by historical equity returns , .
Although the differences are not statistically significant, in comparing the performance of . and & , the constant market premium of 0.06 outperforms the predictability of prior year (historical) S&P500 market premium. when firms approach default. The average rate of return for the non-defaulting firms is positive at all time points, while the average rate of return for the defaulting firms is near zero at time -3 and is negative closer to default (time -2 and time -1). When defaulting firms approach the default event, the rate of return decreases dramatically averaging -0.68 one year prior to default.
To calculate real default probabilities by , instead of risk-neutral probabilities, replaces for the drift in DD (equation 5). It is logical to expect that investors demand higher returns from a riskier firm compared to a safer one. However, , is the realized historical return (not the forward looking expected return) and its negative value may indicate financial deterioration prior to default. This is supported by our data and results, see Table 8 and figure 4 which show the values of and , in the years prior to default. Defaulting and non-defaulting firms have on average similar returns five years before default. However, when firms approach default, their average equity returns fall beneath those of non-defaulting firms and even become negative in the two years prior to default. This result is consistent with prior papers such as Vassalou and Xing (2004) that discovered a negative equity excess return for credit risk.
On one hand , exhibits predictive power, lower , are observed with higher probabilities of default. On the other hand, historical equity return of firms approaching default may yield biased estimates for and hence harm the precision of the model. It appears that using max , , mitigates some of the inaccuracy caused by using historical returns, instead of forward-looking returns, by reducing the effect of negative realized returns.
The volatility of the assets ( )
As a firm approaches a default event often both equity volatility and leverage increase. These two processes affect the calculation of assets volatility in opposite directions. We examine changes in equity and assets volatilities as the firms approach a default event. We use a sample including the 137 defaulting firms and a comparison group of randomly selected 137 non-defaulting firms in parallel years, as explained earlier. Table 9 panel a and Figure 5a show that the mean of historical equity volatility of defaulting firms increases from 0.440 five years before default to 0.956 a year before default. In the same period, the average volatility of equity for the non-defaulting group increases slightly from 0.377 to 0.482. t tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (panel a in Table 9 ) reveal that in all these years, equity volatility is statistically significant higher for defaulting firms than for nondefaulting firms.
This development in historical equity volatility is expected. However, this is not the case for historical assets volatility. 25 Figure 5b and panel b in Table 9 demonstrate that contrary to the nondefaulting firms, historical assets volatility of defaulting firms, calculated by Merton Model, decreases, on average, as the time to the default event becomes shorter. Five years prior to default the mean of historical assets volatility is 0.249 while a year before default it is 0.206. In the same period, the mean of historical assets volatility of non-defaulting firms increases from 0.259 to 0.295. Whereas the historical assets volatility difference between defaulting firms and non-defaulting firms five years prior to default is statistically insignificant, it becomes negative and statistically significant in the year before default. The development in the median of historical assets volatility and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests portrait a similar picture and hence it seems that this pattern is not caused by outliers.
We suspect that our findings regarding assets volatility are related to the fact that we use historical equity volatility rather than expected volatility. Historical volatility of equity is computed using prior
year data whereas the equity value is current. As a firm approaches default, its equity value decreases and its equity volatility increases. Hence using up-to-date equity value jointly with out-of-date equity volatility value causes an underestimation of assets volatility. To assess this hypothesis, we examine assets volatility calculated by the model, using equity volatility implied by stock options market prices as input, instead of historical equity volatility. Implied volatility is forward-looking by nature. Bharath and Shumway (2008) showed that using implied volatility substantially improves Merton model results. We now examine the source of this improvement. It should also be noted that using implied volatility substantially reduces model's applicability since stock options are not available for all the firms. Therefore this examination is merely intended to assess the goodness of current practices in Merton model application.
Following Bharath and Shumway (2008) , for each firm we select the implied volatility of at-themoney 30-day call option on its stocks. We use Optionmetrics data which is available since 1996.
Thus, for observations of 1995 year-end we use the data of the first trading day in 1996 (a single trading day shift) and for other observations we simply use data from the last trading day of the year.
Due to the limited availability of implied volatility data, our sample decreases from 41,831 annual observations to 14,003 and the number of defaults diminishes from 322 to 95. Table 10 and Figure 6 show the development in implied volatility of 40 defaulting firms and 40 nondefaulting firms (the control group) in the five years preceding default. 26 It appears that for both defaulting firms and non-defaulting firms, every year in our sample, the mean and median implied equity volatility is greater than that of historical equity volatility (panels a and b). The same holds for assets volatility calculated using implied volatility, compared to assets volatility calculated using historical volatility (panels c and d). However, the difference between implied equity (assets) volatility and historical equity (assets) volatility is statistically significant only for defaulting firms one year prior to default. More interestingly, the mean of implied assets volatility of defaulting firms remains relatively steady when these firms approach default, rising moderately from 0.241 five years prior to default to 0.245 one year prior to default. These results demonstrate the distortion of asset volatilities calculated using historical equity volatilities
Since this finding is based on a limited sample of 80 firms only we also compare historical volatility to implied volatility for the entire sample (Table 11 ). It appears that implied volatility is greater on average than historical volatility for defaulting and non-defaulting firms, for both equity and assets.
The differences are statistically significant using t tests or Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. However, differences are larger for defaulting firms compared to non-defaulting ones. For example, while the 26 Of the 95 default events we found sufficient data of 5 years prior to the default event for 40 firms only.
mean of historical assets volatility is quite similar for defaulting and non-defaulting firms (0.319 and 0.320 respectively), the implied assets volatility of defaulting firms is much larger than that for nondefaulting firms (0.429 and 0.329 respectively). It is observed that for 68.4 percent of defaulting firms implied volatility (either equity or assets) is greater than historical volatility, compared to 53.5 percent only among non-defaulting firms.
These results suggest that the use of historical volatility (rather than expected volatility) might harm Merton model applications. This practice causes an underestimation of assets volatility. Table 12 compares the AUC for two alternatives. The first is the benchmark model in which assets volatility ( . ) is calculated by solving equations (2) and (4) simultaneously. In the alternative model the assets volatility is set equal to the equity volatility ( ) and the value of assets ( ) is calculated by solving equation (2). The AUC for the simultaneous equation (0.9207) is lower than the one for the volatility of equity (0.9280). The AUC difference is statistically significant using DeLong, et al.
(1988) test. It should be noted that equity volatility is always larger than assets volatility for all firms either defaulting or non-defaulting. This is a cross-firm effect that may be adjusted in the calibration process of the model. However, the calculated assets volatility ( . ), using historical equity volatility in equation (2) and (4) underestimates assets volatility mainly for defaulting firms and hence reduces model's power.
Simplified model alternatives
Bharath and Shumway (2008) ; and that the assets volatility is a weighted average of the equity volatility and an enigmatic debt volatility (see equations 7 and 8). The AUC for this naïve model in our sample is 0.9223 which is higher than that of the "complex" model (0.9207). p value for this difference using DeLong et al. (1988) test is 0.698. Hence, the attractiveness of the naïve model is mainly its simplicity, not its power. We now examine why it performs so well despite its simplicity.
We first show that the 'naïve' choice of asset value A = D+E and the asset drift , , although easy to use, do not enhance the power of the model and are in fact inferior to the choices of the complex model.
The value of assets in the naïve model is simply assumed to be the sum of market value of equity ( ) and the default barrier ( ). that the AUC for this approximation is 0.9184 which smaller than 0.9207, the AUC of using . . Therefore it seems that the discriminative power of the naïve model is not a result of its assets expected return ( ) specification.
The last remaining potential source of the naïve model discriminative power is its assets volatility specification. Figure 7 shows the evolution of for 137 defaulting firms as they approach default together with a control group of 137 non-defaulting firms. We can see that contrary to calculated in the simultaneous solution of (2) and (4), increases when firms approach default.
Additionally, of defaulting firms is slightly higher than that of non-defaulting firms. These results suggest that indeed the naïve model formulation of assets volatility enhances its predictive power compared to the complex model. On the other hand, we argue above that the naïve model choices of assets value ( ) and assets expected return ( ) seem simplistic and inferior to the Merton model. Hence, we examine several additional alternative models, summarized in Table 14 . It shows that the naïve model is inferior to an alternative model (model 3) in which assets value ( ) is calculated by solving equation (2), expected assets return is , , and assets volatility equals the historical equity volatility ( , ). Replacing assets value calculated from equation
(2) with a simple accounting value ( ) in model (4) (2) and (4), it is not optimal and it is inferior to an alternative such as simply using historical equity volatility.
Conclusions
In this paper we examine the sensitivity of Merton model default prediction performance to its parameter specifications. We assess the causes for this sensitivity and for prior studies lukewarm performance. We conclude by providing a few prescriptions to enhance the model accuracy. volatility rather than forward-looking values substantially reduces the models' ability to distinguish between defaulting and non-defaulting firms. This is mainly because of two reasons. First, historical returns result in under-biased estimates of equity volatility especially for defaulting firms. Second, realized past returns of defaulting firms are substantially low while one would expect riskier stocks to offer higher expected return. We conclude by offering a specification that outperforms both the complex application and the naïve application (Bharath and Shumway, 2008 ) of the Merton model.
This study attempts to re-evaluate the current practices in the application of the Merton model. It appears that the reliance of academic literature on sketchy descriptions by practitioners has its disadvantages. Future research on this topic may have other directions, not necessarily in line with what is commonly known as practitioners practice. This study demonstrates that enhancements in the estimation of the expected assets return and assets volatility may significantly improve the quality of the model output. Tables   Table 1: sample distribution over time   This table reports the observations' distribution in the sample period. The table presents the number of firms observed, the number of default events during the year and the ratio between them for each year in the sample.
Ratio of default events to the observations
Number of default events (during the Year) E is the firm's market value of equity (the product of the price per share times the number of outstanding shares); , is the annual firm's equity return (the average daily equity return times the number of trading days); , is the annual firm's stock return volatility (the standard deviation of daily stock returns times the square root of the trading days in a year); is the beta computed from daily return and the value-weighted CRSP index (NYSE/NASDAQ/ AMEX is the annualized implied volatility of at-the money call options on firms stocks. , is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns in the prior year. Assets volatility is calculated by solving equations (2) and (4) (2) and (4) and the other is a model in which assets volatility is set equal to the equity volatility ( , ) and the assets value ( ) is calculated by solving equation (2) (2) and (4) or simply the sum of market value of equity ( ) and the default barrier ( ). The assets expected returns alternatives include:
Number of observations
. based on of the assets calculated using historical of equity, assuming the market premium equals 0.06; or , the equity return in the previous year; or the larger of , and (the risk-free interest rate, 1-year treasury bills yield to maturity). Assets volatility is either a solution of equations (2) and (4); or the annualized volatility of daily equity return in the previous year ( , ); or is based on Bharath and Shumway specification of assets volatility ( (2) .
Figure 4:
The average annual rate of return on the firm's equity in the previous year ( , ) and the average expected assets return ( ) while the defaulting firms (137 firms) approach the default event.
.
(based on the of the assets calculated from historical of equity and assuming the market premium equals 0.06). A control group of 137 non-defaulting firms is used for comparison.
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Expected assets return ( Table 10 for the data and model specifications.
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